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BLACKS, IMMIGRANTS, AND THE ROOTS OF
POVERTY IN AMERICA
ANTHONY MONACO*
"Conquest of poverty is well within our means."1 So her-
alded the Economic Report of the President in 1964. And for
a brief time, the enthusiasm seemed well-founded. Between
1964 and 1968, the poverty rate declined from 19% to 13%.2
Seventeen years later, however, much of the optimism has
faded. In 1985, some thirty-five million Americans, 14% of
the population, lived below the official poverty line.3 Many
terms have been associated with the war on poverty since
1964. "Conquest" is' most assuredly not among them.
Some suggest that the official poverty rate, while statisti-
cally accurate for one year, may exaggerate the extent of
poverty in that it does not indicate the duration of poverty for
any given individual or family.4 Some people suffer through
relatively brief periods of financial hardship due to illness,
temporary unemployment, or personal problems. As many as
one quarter of the population experienced some poverty over
the last ten years.' At the same time, studies indicate that up
to half of the persons who are poor in a given year will be
above the poverty line the following year." These "marginal"
poor are indicative of a fluidity in the poverty rate which
makes rigid categorization troublesome.
There is nonetheless a mounting fear that poverty is be-
coming a permanent way of life for a growing number of
Americans. Known collectively as the "underclass," these
poor inhabit the nation's teeming urban ghettos.7 Their lifes-
* B.A. 1983, St. John Fisher College; J.D. 1986, University of No-
tre Dame, Thos. J. White Scholar 1984-1986.
1. Gwarney & McCabell, Have Anti-Poverty Programs Increased Pov-
erty?, 5 CATO J. 1, 2 (1985).
2. C. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND 245 (1984).
3. Chicago Tribune, Sept. 15, 1985, at 20, col. 5 (citing Census
Bureau Figures).
4. See, e.g., Kondratas, Poverty and Equity: Problems of Definition, 9
INST. SOCIOECON. STUD. 37 (1985).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. A Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC) re-
port concluded that "the nation faces few problems as formidable as the
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tyles are characterized by repeated exposure to unemploy-
ment, violence, drug addiction and alcoholism, and frag-
mented or non-existent family life.' Martin Anderson has put
their number at twenty-five million.' More conservative esti-
mates range from five to ten million.1" Alarmingly, the un-
derclass appears to be increasingly impervious to traditional
values such as education, family responsibility, and upward
mobility.11 The ghetto poor may also be more prone to pat-
terns of intergenerational poverty.' Up to 40% of AFDC re-
cipients, for example, grew up in households which had re-
ceived AFDC payments.'
If there has been any progress against poverty in the last
twenty years, and arguably there has, it is due almost entirely
to transfer payments which have lifted incomes to or above
the poverty line." At first glance, one is inclined to ask: So
presence of a group of people, largely concentrated in its principal cities,
who live at the margin of society." K. AULETrA, THE UNDERCLASS 25 (1982).
8. Id.
9. Chicago Tribune, supra note 3, at 20, col. 3.
10. University of Michigan researchers estimate that some five mil-
lion people in the United States meet this description. Id.
11. Sociologist Marshall Clinard writes that, in urban ghettos,
"there is a greater tolerance of deviant behavior, a higher delinquency and
crime rate, and an ambivalence toward quasi-criminal activities committed
against the 'outside' world." M. CLINARD, SLUMS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOP-
MENT 12 (1970). Auletta writes: "whatever the cause-whether it is the
-fault of the people themselves or of society, whether poverty is a cause or
an effect-most students of poverty believe that the underclass suffers
from behavioral as well as income deficiencies. The underclass usually oper-
ates outside the generally accepted boundaries of society." K. AULETTA,
supra note 7, at 28.
12. Glicken, Transgenerational Welfare Dependency, J. CONTEMP. STUD.
Summer 1981, at 31; Kilson, Black Social Classes and Intergenerational Pov-
erty, PUB. INTEREST, Summer 1981, at 58, 62. Clinard writes: "[T]he slum
has a culture of its own, and this culture is a way of life. This learned way
of life is passed from generation to generation, with its own rationale,
structure, and defense mechanisms .... ." Clinard, supra note 11, at 11.
But see Poverty in the United States: Where Do We Stand Now?, IRP Focus,
Winter 1984, at 8.
13. Glicken, supra note 12, at 31-32.
14. According to the Institute for Research on Poverty:
though progress has been made in raising the absolute standard of
living of the poverty population, no equivalent progress is evident
in their market incomes or their incomes relative to the remainder
of the population. No marked reduction in earnings inequality or
in family income inequality has occurred . . . . We conclude
therefore that government transfer policy has played the single most
important role in reducing measured poverty."
Poverty in the United States: Where Do We Stand?, IRP Focus, Winter 1981-82,
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what? As long as persons are above the poverty line, what
difference does it make how they get there? The fact is that
how they get there may very well make all the difference. As
we shall note in more detail later, millions of newly-arrived,
destitute Americans improved their economic and social sta-
tus by working themselves and their families out of poverty.
In contrast, millions of Americans today are above the pov-
erty line only because money has been transferred to them.
The process is somewhat akin to giving every American a col-
lege diploma and declaring that we have achieved 100% liter-
acy. These "latent" poor are not necessarily any more capa-
ble of providing for themselves or their families, and indeed
run the risk of becoming increasingly less so. '6 Yet, through
some redistributive legerdemain, their poverty has been
"eliminated."
This article will attempt, albeit in abbreviated form, to
identify the elements which constitute what we might call the
ascent from poverty. In addition, it will address the impact of
welfare spending on this process. It is quixotic to suggest that
any "solution" to poverty is imminent. The contemporary
debate surrounding public policy approaches to poverty is
disturbingly similar to that preceding the enactment of Eng-
land's Poor Law in 1834, suggesting that there is little of
novelty in the controversy. 6 At the same time, identifying
those elements which have enabled the poor to engage in pat-
terns of upward mobility may, at the very least, provide some
direction for future initiatives to assist the poor.
In this effort, this article will refer repeatedly to the
black and immigrant experiences in America. Any inquiry
into poverty in the United States addresses black poverty
largely by default. That is not to suggest that the majority of
at 2.
15. See Murray's discussion of the latent poor. C. MURRAY, supra
note 2, at 64.
16. Gertrude Himmelfarb, Professor of History at the City Univer-
sity of New York, observes:
it was this issue [demoralization of the poor] that Poor Law re-
formers tried to address. They were concerned that the demorali-
zation and pauperization of the poor were a consequence of the
'indiscriminate' distribution of relief. It's true that they were also
concerned about the excessive amount of relief being distributed,
which was reflected in ever-rising expenditures on the poor rates.
But they were much more concerned with the effect of the relief
upon the poor.
A Roundtable Discussion, Part I: The Poverty Debate in 19th Century England, 5
MANHArrAN REP. ON ECON. POL'Y 3 (1985).
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the poor are black. The white poor outnumber black poor
two-to-one. Proportionately, however, blacks remain the
poorest of all major ethnic and racial groups. Thirty-four
percent of all blacks live below the poverty line, compared to
11% of whites and 28% of Hispanics. 17 More disconcertingly,
blacks also comprise the overwhelming majority of the "un-
derclass," the most disenfranchised of the poor. 8
Additionally, blacks are, in some way, the litmus test for
government efforts to reduce poverty. Because blacks are
proportionately among the poorest Americans, they are axio-
matically more affected by government programs aimed at
the poor. Some 46% of all black households and 80% of all
poor black households receive some form of public assis-
tance.19 Some 40% of all blacks between the ages of sixteen
and twenty-four have been enrolled in a CETA program. 21
Whether by intention or purely by result, blacks, as a group,
have become the disproportionate target of the government
welfare effort.
In marked contrast to the immobility of the black poor,
immigrants to the United States continue to demonstrate a
remarkable capacity to assimilate and prosper. A detailed
study by Barry Chiswick found that immigrants reach or sur-
pass the national income average within thirteen to twenty
years of their arrival.2 Ironically, some of the immigrants'
economic success occurs in predominantly black neighbor-
hoods. From New York to Los Angeles, newly-arrived immi-
grants have succeeded in opening or buying small businesses
in black enclaves and have defied the expectations of failure
which often paralyze such communities. 2
There is almost no defensible way to directly compare
different ethnic or racial groups. Differences in history, cul-
ture, and economic or social conditions render such compari-
sons inutile at best, and at worst, provide unnecessary ammu-
17. Based on Figures released in August 1985. Chicago Tribune,
supra note 3, at 20, col. 5.
18. G. DUNCAN, YEARS OF POVERTY, YEARS OF PLENTY 48 (1984).
19. E. FARLEY, BLACKS AND WHITES, CLOSING THE GAP 68 (1984).
20. C. MURRAY, supra note 2, at 71.
21. Chiswick, The Effect of Americanization on the Earnings of Foreign-
born Men, 86 J. POL. ECON. 919 (1978).
22. In Houston, for example, Indochinese immigrants own or oper-
ate 24-hour convenience stores in predominantly black neighborhoods. In
New York City, many small businesses in black areas have been taken over
by Asian immigrants. In Miami, the average income of Cuban and other
Hispanic businesses is twice that of black businesses. TIME, Jul. 8, 1985, at
56-57.
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nition for pejorative ethnic or racial stereotypes. It is,
therefore, not my purpose to judge the merits of a given eth-
nic or racial group through invidious comparisons with
others. Rather, it is to discern how the poor of varying ethnic
or racial backgrounds have reacted to their poverty in light
of such historical, economic, or social shortcomings. What is
relevant is not that one ethnic or racial group has made
greater progress than another, but that certain factors are
common and indeed critical to the success which these
groups have had or will have, and that other factors, despite
popular notions to the contrary, have not been as important.
There is a notable reticence about addressing the dispar-
ity between black and immigrant economic achievement. A
sensitive racial climate doubtless checks efforts to assess the
problem dispassionately. Yet, as this article hopes to suggest,
the continuing disparity is owing not to race but to policy,
and it merits disinterested analysis. In any event, tracing the
sources of the divergence is essential to understanding both
the roots of black poverty and the persistence of poverty as a
broader social phenomenon.
I. BLACK POVERTY
As an initial observation, it bears noting that a large
number of blacks are not poor. In 1980, some 1.4 million
black families had incomes above $25,000.23 College edu-
cated black males now earn substantially the equivalent of
their white counterparts. 4 College educated black women
earn 122% of the income of similarly educated white women.
The success, however, has been uneven. The most pressing
economic concern of the black community, and perhaps of
the nation, remains the millions of blacks who live below the
poverty level, now more than one-third of all blacks.26
Black poverty has been attributed to a number of factors,
perhaps most recurringly to racism, to the economy, to a
weak entrepreneurial history owing to the black experience
with slavery, and to relative political impotence. It is nearly
incontestable that each, to some degree, has slowed black ec-
onomic progress. But how overwhelming are any of these fac-
tors in shaping the long-term fortunes of an entire racial or
ethnic group?
23. C. MURRAY, supra note 2, at 54-55.
24. E. FARLEY, supra note 19, at 126.
25. See supra note 17.
19851
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
A. Racism
The concern of this article is not whether racism exists,
or whether it is undesirable. It doubtless persists, and it is
clearly odious. It would be callous to understate the pain of
individuals victimized by hatred and ignorance solely because
of race or sex or creed. The relevant inquiry here, however,
is the impact which racism might have on the economic as-
cendancy of an entire racial or ethnic group over an ex-
tended period of time.
Some might argue that the perspective is skewed and
that the inquiry should focus on how economic success affects
racism. Bigotry has often proven to be the result of economic
status rather than of antipathy to color or creed. At the turn
of the century, for example, blacks moved out of neighbor-
hoods which were being settled by the even poorer Italian
immigrants.2" As Italian-Americans became more prosperous
the trend reversed. Surveys indicate that middle class whites
prefer middle class blacks as neighbors over poor whites.1
7
Middle class blacks have even, on occasion, gone to court to
enjoin the construction of low-income housing projects in
their neighborhoods, housing which would be occupied
predominantly by poor blacks. 8
But let us assume for the moment that racism and dis-
crimination are products of visceral disinclination to a partic-
ular race or ethnic group. What is the economic impact of
such malevolence? First, it should be noted that bigotry is not
a problem unique to the American experience and indeed
has voluminous historical precedent. No racial group evi-
dences this more dramatically than the Chinese, victims of
bitter animosity in both Southeast Asia and in the United
States.
Chinese immigration to Southeast Asia began in earnest
with the arrival of European colonists in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. Easily distinguishable from the indige-
nous populations, the Chinese readily became targets of na-
tive resentment. They were subjected to special taxes and
quotas, were frequently confined to certain parts of cities,
26. T. SOWELL, ETHNIC AMERICA 277 (1981).
27. A 1972 Gallup poll found that 37% of middle-class whites re-
sented lower class whites moving into their neighborhood, as opposed to
the 24% opposed to middle class blacks moving into the neighborhood. W.
WILLIAMS, THE STATE AGAINST BLACKS 12 (1985).
28. See Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970); Banks v.
Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
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and were banned from a number of commercial activities. 9
The resentment often led to mob violence, much of it fright-
ening for its sheer brutality. In 1603, some 23,000 Chinese
were slaughtered in the Philippines alone."0 In the eighteenth
century, over 10,000 Chinese were massacred in Indo-
China."' In Indonesia, Chinese settlements were raided and
the inhabitants raped and burned alive as late as the 1930's.32
Lest the figures become mere abstractions, it is helpful to re-
call that more Chinese lost their lives in Southeast Asia in a
span of days than blacks in the entire history of racially-moti-
vated lynchings in the United States. 3
Despite such rabid enmity, the Chinese succeeded in be-
coming Southeast Asia's premier economic brokers. Compris-
ing less than 5% of the population, they came to dominate
rice mills, textiles, iron and steel works, and the chemical in-
dustry.34 In Thailand, by the late 1970's, the Chinese con-
trolled from 50 to 95% of the capital in banking and finance,
medicine, transportation, and the export-import
trade-despite comprising only one-twentieth of the popula-
tion.35 In Malaysia, the Chinese own thirteen times as many
corporations as the far more numerous Malaysians, notwith-
standing laws prohibiting Chinese entry into certain
industries. 6
In the United States, Chinese immigration began slowly,
with the arrival of the first immigrants in the 1840's to work
the California gold mines.3 7 The number of Chinese-born im-
migrants was small compared to the wave of European immi-
gration which was to follow, peaking at 100,000 in 1880.38
Yet reaction to their arrival was immediate. The Chinese be-
came frequent targets of mob violence and were often forced
to relocate entire communities. 9 The malice soon won legal
sanction. From 1854 to 1874, Chinese immigrants were not
permitted to testify in court, making them lucrative prey for
29. T. SOWELL, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RACE 27 (1983).
30. Id. at 41.
31. Id. at 43.
32. W.H. HuTT, THE ECONOMICS OF THE COLOUR BAR 81 (1964).
33. T. SOWELL, supra note 29, at 167.
34. Id. at 24.
35. Id. at 33.
36. Id. at 37.
37. R. LEE, THE CHINESE IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 9 (1960).
38. S. LYMAN, THE ASIAN IN THE WEST 79 (1970).
39. T. SOWELL, supra note 26, at 137.
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criminals.40 In 1882, Congress barred Asian immigrants from
citizenship.41 In 1882, the Chinese Exclusion Act prohibited
more Chinese from entering the country, condemning the
largely male immigrant colony to bachelorhood. 42 Various
laws at the turn of the century, and as late as the 1940's, pro-
hibited Asians from marrying Caucasians and owning land.43
During World War II, 100,000 Americans of Japanese and
Chinese descent found themselves in internment camps, de-
spite no proof of disloyalty.
The Chinese began their economic adventures in the
United States humbly. Both envied and disparaged because
of their industry and perseverance, they labored at menial
and dangerous jobs in the vineyards, canneries, railroads, and
notorious laundromats.44 Historian Thomas Sowell has re-
marked that "[t]hose who coined the phrase 'not a China-
man's chance' knew little of the resolution and perseverance
of these people. '4 5 One hundred years later, the Chinese-
Americans, along with the Japanese-Americans, are the na-
tion's foremost economic and educational achievers. In 1980,
Asian-Americans earned the highest incomes in the United
States. 6 And Asian-American students regularly outperform
all ethnic groups on college entrance exams.' Although
Asian-Americans constitute only 1.8% of the U.S. population,
they represent 10% of the student body at Harvard, 22% at
Berkely, and 19% at MIT.48
The remarkable success of the Chinese both in Southeast
Asia and in the United States belies the proposition that dis-
crimination necessarily prevents the ascendancy of an entire
racial group. Blacks themselves have rendered the notion sus-
pect. Blacks of West Indian descent, for example, are not dis-
40. S. LYMAN, CHINESE-AMERICANS 82 (1974).
41. R. LEE, supra note 37, at 12.
42. Id..
43. Fourteen states-Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah,
Virginia, and Wyoming-specifically forbade Chinese persons from mar-
rying whites. Lyman, supra note 40, at 73.
44. Id. at 73-74.
45. T. SOWELL, supra note 29, at 49.
46. The 1980 Census shows that the income of the Japanese-Ameri-
cans was $27,350, the Chinese $22,550, and the national average $19,900.
To America With Skills, TIME, July 8, 1985, at 44.
47. Bell, The Triumph of Asian-Americans, NEW REPUBLIC, July 15-22,
1985, at 24, 26.
48. Id.
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tinguishable by color from native blacks. 49 Yet in the second
generation, West Indian blacks not only outperform native
blacks, they surpass the national income average) °
It would be inapposite to equate, without qualification,
black and Chinese experiences with racism. Despite the sever-
ity of racism in both Southeast Asia and the United States,
the Chinese were never subject to legalized slavery. And at
least in the United States, legal barriers to equality persisted
considerably longer for blacks than for Chinese-Americans.
Yet with the long-overdue civil and political rights achieve-
ments of the 1960's and 1970's, racism has become less valid
as an explanation for the persistence of black poverty. Racism
can retard the economic ascendancy of a racial group, but as
the Chinese have rather forcefully demonstrated, it does not
necessarily inhibit their success.
B. The Economy
Nor is the persistence of black poverty readily explained
by economic fluctuations. During the 1950's, the per capita
GNP grew at the modest rate of 1.5% annually." By the end
of the decade, the poverty rate had declined for all age and
race categories. 5 In the 1970's, the per capita GNP in-
creased 2.1% per annum, which, though less than the rate in
the 1960's, was still higher than in the 1950's.53 Yet unlike in
the 1950's, the poverty rate at the end of the 1970's had
edged upward.54 One extensive study of poverty and eco-
nomic fluctuations arrived at similar conclusions: "[T]he eco-
nomic differences between the 1960's and 1970's account for
some of the persistence of poverty, but not all of it. This
analysis also suggests that high rates of economic growth
would produce only moderate declines in poverty." 5
Consider, in addition, what Charles Murray has referred
to as the "anomalous plunge in black labor force participa-
tion." 6 Labor force participation measures the number of
persons actively participating in the economy at all income
49. T. SOWELL, supra note 26, at 220.
50. Id.
51. Gwartney & McCaleb, supra note 1, at 7.
52. C. MURRAY, supra note 2, at 245.
53. Gwartney & McCabell, supra note 1, at 7.
54. By 1979, for example, the poverty rate stood at 13%, up from
I 1 in 1973. In contrast, the rate declined between 1950 and 1959, from
307c to 24%. C. MURRAY, supra note 2 at 65.
55. E. FARLEY, supra note 19, at 160.
56. C. MURRAY, supra note 2, at 76.
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levels. In the 1950's, during modest economic growth, the la-
bor force participation rate among blacks was nearly 85%, a
rate equal to that for whites.57 By the late 1960's, when a
sustained economic expansion had reduced the unemploy-
ment rate to 3.4%, the black labor force participation rate
had declined anywhere from 8% to 18%, depending on age
group.58
The patent response to such figures, and to any compari-
sons with past immigrants, is that jobs traditionally taken by
the poor no longer exist. If this is true, then the presence of
some three to six million illegal aliens in this country is an
anomaly without equal.59 The more probable case, of course,
is that there is no anomaly at all and that the illegals are tak-
ing those menial and unremunerative jobs sought by many
poor immigrant arrivals in the past. Rather than insisting
that the work traditionally performed by the poor does not
exist, the more plausible argument for the welfare state advo-
cates is that the contemporary poor should not have to take
such work. Unfortunately, this does little more than beg the
question.
C. Entrepreneurial Background
The Chinese immigrants brought with them an en-
trepreneurial spirit which proved instrumental to their eco-
nomic success. One might conclude from their experience
that such talent is a precondition to integration in a capitalist
economy. Blacks, for example, entered the economy having
emerged directly and abruptly from slavery, an institution
which for obvious reasons physically and psychologically had
dissuaded initiative. 0 Entrepreneurial talents, one would sup-
pose, would vastly ease the transition into a relatively unbri-
dled market economy. What is not so clear is whether the
absence of these talents and the historical opportunity to de-
velop them unequivocally condemns a given group to the
fringes of the economy. In this context, the Italian-American
immigrant experience provides cogent insights.
Italian-Americans today are a solidly middle class group
57. Id. at 76.
58. Id. at 77.
59. No one knows for sure how many illegal immigrants there are in
the United States, though the number of Mexican illegals is believed to be
anywhere from three to six million. The Disappearing Border, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Aug. 19, 1985, at 33.
60. T. SOWELL, supra note 26, at 187.
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with incomes surpassing all ethnic groups save the Scotch and
Germans. 1 Their current affluence contrasts sharply with
their American baptism at the turn of the century, when they
were perhaps the poorest of all racial or ethnic groups. 62
One would suspect from the Italian-Americans' remarka-
ble improvement over the course of three or four genera-
tions that they, like the Chinese, had brought with them
strong entrepreneurial values. In fact, the opposite is true.
Sociologist Joseph LoPreato observes that of all ethnic cul-
tures transplanted to the United States, "none was in a
weaker position to survive, much less to aid its bearers in the
necessary transformation, than that of the Italians."6
Approximately 90% of all Italian immigrants came from
Southern Italy, then one of the poorest regions in the West-
ern world.6 ' Their native towns, isolated geographically from
the more prosperous north, had remained archetypal feudal
communities." Living conditions of peasants were worse than
those of American slaves.66 Impermeable class divisions had
persisted for centuries, and birth into a "pezzenti" (peasant)
family largely assured that status for life. 67 In this rigid sys-
tem of social stratification, aspirations to upward mobility
were viewed with disdain. 8
In the United States the Italian immigrants found them-
selves at odds with "foreign" values such as initiative and in-
ter-class mobility. 69 They were fatalistic and superstitious. 0
Italian men were valued by employers for their tolerance for
long hours and low pay, but they generally required greater
supervision.1 Italian pupils performed very poorly, and par-
ents openly discouraged education, viewing it as a threat to
family unity.72 The Italian immigrants' difficulty in adjusting
61. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1983, Magazine, at 31, col. 2.
62. In 1910, Italians had lower incomes than both native whites and
blacks. R. GAMBINO, BLOOD OF My BLOOD 308 (1974).
63. J. LOPREATO, ITALIAN-AMERICANS 56 (1970).
64. Id. at 12.
65. Id. at 21-25.
66. R. FOGEL & S. ENGERMEN, TIME ON THE CROSS 125 (125).
67. J. LoPREATO, supra note 63, at 23; T. SOWELL, supra note 26, at
104.
68. T. SOWELL, supra note 26, at 113.
69. J. LoPREATO, supra note 63, at 28.
70. T. SOWELL, supra note 26, at 106.
71. In 1911, 63% of Italian school children were behind the normal
grade level. Id. at 120.
72. S. MONDEBELLO, THE ITALIAN-AMERICAN IMMIGRANT IN URBAN
AMERICA 66 (1960).
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to American life led some commentators to speculate that
they were genetically inferior.738
It was only as first- and second-generation Italian-Ameri-
cans became comfortable with American institutions that
their ambivalence toward education and upward mobility
subsided . 4 By the third and fourth generation, they had gen-
erally achieved middle class status. Their early American his-
tory aptly demonstrates, however, that a deficient "capitalist"
background is not a permanent handicap to upward mobility,
and that indeed, the free market is quite adept at planting
and fostering entrepreneurial values in groups which have
none.
D. Political Power
It has become almost axiomatic that political power is a
precondition to economic success. Interestingly, both the
Chinese-Americans (and the Chinese in Southeast Asia) and
the Italian-Americans almost entirely avoided the political
process throughout their economic ascendancy. Chinese-
Americans rarely took any interest in elected office, and their
"political" activity was largely confined to evading discrimi-
natory laws."' Italian-American political candidates regularly
had trouble attracting their own compatriots' votes.7 6 While
Italian-Americans have improved their political fortunes in
the Northeast as of late, neither group has become a political
force commensurate with its economic and social success.
In contrast to the Italian and Chinese immigrants, the
newly-arrived Irish pursued political activity with fervor and
success. The Irish essentially dominated American municipal
politics in many large cities at the turn of the century. De-
spite their political success, the Irish were among the least
economically successful of all immigrant groups, and exper-
ienced widespread social problems.7 7 Even today, Irish-Amer-
ican incomes lag behind those of other white ethnic groups,
notwithstanding their continuing prominence in politics.7 8
73. J. LoPREATO, supra note 63, at 86. By the third generation, edu-
cation became a highly valued goal for Italian-Americans.
74. T. SOWELL, supra note 29, at 70; W. WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at
6.
75. T. SOWELL, supra note 26, at 128.
76. Id. at 30.
77. T. SOWELL, supra note 29, at 68-69; T. SOWELL, supra note 26, at
280.
78. W. WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 6.
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The contrasting fortunes of the Italian- and Chinese-Ameri-
cans disparage the notion that economic progress is impossi-
ble without political power, or conversely that political power
guarantees such progress. For blacks, who have placed enor-
mous faith in the political process, this lesson should not be
lightly regarded.
All of the foregoing in no sense belittles the hardships
which racism, economic fluctuations, lack of entrepreneurial
history, and political powerlessness have caused racial or eth-
nic groups, and blacks in particular. They are hardly imagi-
nary problems. At the same time, emphasis on the role and
impact of these problems without a focus on the means to
overcome them merely engenders passivity and, to some ex-
tent, hostility. Glenn Loury, while acknowledging the rela-
tionship of racism and behavioral difficulties, argues that it is
inappropriate and even dangerous to equate fault with respon-
sibility.70 He suggests that emphasis on the former obscures
the more important considerations of what is to be done, and
who is to do it."' The resiliency of some ethnic groups, de-
spite ample adversity, suggests that the focus should not be so
much on whether past injustices or a cruel history cause so-
cial problems, but on the promotion of those social forces
and institutions which make such problems surmountable.
E. The Family
The most familiar of these institutions is the family. And
more than all other Americans, poor blacks have been rav-
aged by the collapse of the family. One-half of all black fami-
lies are now headed by a woman. 8' Twenty-five percent of
black children are born to teenage mothers, and one in five
black children live with a mother who has never married.8 2
More than half of all black children are born out of
wedlock.83
Family dissolution may better explain the economic
plight of many poor blacks than the traditional litany of
causes. Female-headed black households, now half of all black
families, are twice as likely to be poor as two-parent fami-
79. Loury, The Moral Quandary of the Black Community, PUB. INTER-
EST, Spring 1985, at 10.
80. Id.
81. N.Y. Times, November 20, 1983, at Al, col. 4.
82. Id.
83. Id. at A54, cols. 3-4; E. FARLEY, supra note 19, at 141.
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lies.8 Sixty percent of female-headed black households fall
below the poverty line.85 In contrast, the median income for
married black couples in 1982 was $20,586, well above the
official poverty level.86 If there had been no change in the
living arrangements of blacks between 1970 and 1980, "eco-
nomic gains for blacks would have parallelled those for
whites." 87
Beyond the purely economic considerations, family dys-
function has even more unfortunate consequences for human
capital. Many black children, for example, grow up in homes
where there is no father figure, raised by mothers not long
out of childhood themselves. Despite the heroic efforts of
many poor single mothers, the single parent family is, at least
among the poor, probably less successful in transmitting val-
ues necessary for adjustment in a competitive market econ-
omy and civil society. Illegitimate children born to teenage
mothers tend to be less healthy. 88 As early as 1940 E. Frank-
lin Frazier, a black sociologist, warned of the decreased abil-
ity of children from fatherless homes to adjust to societal
norms.89 The probability of neglect and abuse is higher for
children born out of wedlock. 90 A study of black children
from fatherless families found that they were generally "less
responsible, less able to defer gratification, and less interested
in achievement" than children from two-parent families.91
For human as well as economic considerations, the need to
reverse the decline of the family among the black poor is
compelling.
But many of those concerned with the problem misinter-
pret the causes of the decline of the black family. A recent
statement issued at a conference of black leaders, for exam-
ple, declared that "[t]he present black family crisis can be at-
tributed almost directly to racism. '"92 Others might insist that
the crisis can be traced to high levels of poverty among
blacks. Neither contention is entirely or even largely accu-
rate. Throughout slavery, when racism was not only perva-
84. E. FARLEY, supra note 19, at 141.
85. N.Y. Times, supra note 81, at A54, col. 3-4.
86. Id.
87. E. FARLEY, supra note 19, at 158.
88. C. MURRAY, supra note 2, at 127.
89. K. AULETTA, supra note 7, at 40.
90. V. FUCHS, How WE LIVE: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE OF AMERI-
CANS FROM BIRTH TO DEATH 28 (1983).
91. G. GILDER, SEXUAL SUICIDE 114 (1973).
92. N.Y. Times, supra note 81, at A54, col. 4.
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sive but codified, the family remained the most important
and enduring black social institution.9" Most slave children
grew up in two-parent households. 94 Following the civil war,
journalists reported encountering former slaves who had
travelled across states in search of a lost spouse.
The pattern of strong family cohesion continued long af-
ter slavery. A case study of blacks in Boston at the turn of the
century found that, despite dire economic and social condi-
tions, only 11% of black wives had been deserted by their
husbands, lower than the figure for Irish immigrants.9" In
1905, four-fifths of black families in New York City were
headed by the father.9 7 In 1940 and again in 1950, nearly
80% of black families consisted of two-parent households. 98 It
is somewhat incongruous that in light of the stability of the
black family in slavery and throughout the first half of this
century that racism and poverty are so frequently advanced
as the overriding causes for the modern black family crisis.
What is clear is that the family unit can play an impor-
tant role in the efforts of the poor to overcome poverty.
Two-parent black families, and indeed two-parent families of
all races, perform remarkably better than their single-parent
counterparts. If the trend towards family dissolution among
poor urban blacks continues unabated, the prospects for im-
provement will become increasingly bleak.
F. Enterprise
Nathan Caplan, a researcher at the University of Michi-
gan, recently completed a three year study of nearly 1,500
Indochinese refugee families.99 Three years after their arrival
in the United States during a serious recession, more than
two-thirds had jobs earning twice the national poverty
level. 100 Twenty-five percent had achieved perfect 4.0 scores
in U.S. schools, though most arrived with limited knowledge
93. T. SOWELL, supra note 26, at 188, 222.
94. Id. at 189.
95. Id. at 190.
96. Pleck, The Two-Parent Household: Black Family Structure in Late
Nineteenth Century Boston, in IN SEARCH OF THE PROMISED LAND 124 (T.
Kornweibel ed. -198 1).
97. H. GUTMAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM 1750-
1925 (1977).
98. C. MURRAY, supra note 2, at 129.
99. Study cited in William Raspberry's editorial C. MURRAY A New
Myth For Blacks to Live By, Wash. Post, July 19, 1985, at 25, col. 5.
100. Id.
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of English.10 Forty-four percent had earned perfect scores in
math. 102
The striking success of the Indochinese refugees echoes
that of Father Divine's black followers during the Depres-
sion. A captivating preacher with occasional delusions of di-
vinity, Father Divine rallied hundreds of thousands of poor
blacks to his missions in the late 1920's and 1930's.103 Sev-
enty percent of his converts were unemployed, and more
than one-third received public assistance.' 4 Exhorted to ex-
ercise self-discipline and to reject relief money, Father Di-
vine's followers formed and managed hundreds of successful
businesses during the nation's worst economic crisis in its his-
tory. 5 In Harlem alone, Father Divine's followers operated
twenty-five restaurants, six grocery stores, ten barber shops,
two dozen huckster wagons, and a coal business.06 By the
end of the Depression, these businesses had accumulated mil-
lions of dollars in savings, no small feat for the poorest and
most maligned citizens in a nation on the brink of economic
collapse.10 7
But perhaps no ethnic group has demonstrated more re-
siliency in the face of adversity than the Jews, victims of vilifi-
cation and persecution throughout their history. In Europe,
the anti-Semitic venom led to the slaughter of some six mil-
lion innocent Jews in Nazi Germany. In the United States,
the social climate was more tolerant, but the majority of Jews
nonetheless humbly began their American adventure. They
arrived overwhelmingly poor. More than one-half million
Jews packed into one and one-half square miles in Manhat-
tan; 0 ' half of all Jewish families slept three or four to a
room, one quarter of them slept five or more to a room;109
and they worked long hours at low pay, in neighborhoods
where the "crush and stench were suffocating. '"" 0 By the
1980's, Jews were among the highest earning of all Ameri-
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. M. SMITH, GOD IN A ROLLS ROYCE 88-89 (1936).
104. Id.
105. R. WEISBROT, FATHER DIVINE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY 123-24 (1983).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. T. SOWELL, supra note 29, at 91.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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cans."' Despite a haunting history of discrimination and per-
secution, the Jews have excelled in virtually every nation
where they are found in significant numbers.
What enabled the Jews, the Chinese, Fr. Divine's follow-
ers, and the recent Indo-Chinese refugees to succeed despite
abject poverty, discrimination, and even persecution? They
all shared common attributes which we might collectively
term as enterprise. Enterprise in this context entails not so
much an economic disposition as a set of values - faith,
hope, creativity, determination, and perseverance among
them. Certainly, the groups discussed above possessed these.
These are values which enable the poor to face their condi-
tion with patience, determination, and faith in their ultimate
capacity to overcome it. The Lay Commission on Catholic
Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy suggests that enter-
prise is a virtue which "inspires imagination and adven-
ture."11 However one wishes to characterize it, the ascent
from poverty is unimaginable without it.
II. THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC SPENDING
If family and enterprise are fundamental to the efforts of
the poor to improve their lot, it is axiomatic that public pol-
icy should foster both. Over the last twenty years, the nation
has mounted an enormous campaign to assist the poor. Social
welfare expenditures tripled between 1965 and 1980, an in-
crease of over 200% (even when inflation is taken into ac-
count). 13 Noble intentions aside, how has this effort fared at
promoting either family or enterprise?
A. Family
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan recently recalled an
observation made at the outset of the War on Poverty:
From the wild Irish slums of the 19th Century Eastern Sea-
board, to the riot-torn suburbs of Los Angeles, there is one
unmistakable lesson in American history: a community that
allows a large number of young men to grow up in broken
families, dominated by women, never acquiring a set of ra-
111. Id. at 187.
112. Lay Commission on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S.
Economy, Toward the Future: Catholic Social Thought and the U.S. Econ-
omy-A Lay Letter, CATHOLICISM IN CRISIS, Nov. 1984, at 1, 20 [hereinafter
cited as Lay Letter].
113. C. MURRAY, supra note 2, at 242.
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tional expectations about the future, that community asks
for and gets chaos. Crime, violence, unrest, disorder-most
particularly the furious, unrestrained lashing out at the
whole social structure-that is not only to be expected; it is
very near to inevitable.1 1 4
That observation, almost prophetic in hindsight, was made at
a time when the illegitimacy rate for blacks stood at 25%.115
After twenty years, and tens of billions of dollars, some of
which were aimed at reversing that very trend, the rate has
more than doubled.
Is there a correlation between public spending and fam-
ily dissolution? The parallel rise in welfare expenditures and
illegitimacy is, at the very least, disquieting. An extensive fed-
eral study of the feasibility of a negative income tax (NIT)
produced some disturbing figures in this regard. The nega-
tive income tax essentially would guarantee a minimum in-
come in the form of a "negative" tax to anyone whose wages
fall below a prescribed level.1 16 The two most extensive tests
were conducted in Seattle and Denver, where approximately
10,000 NIT recipients were compared to a control group. 117
The results indicated that, as compared to the control group
which received no benefits, recipients experienced a 36% in-
crease in marital dissolution for whites, 42% for blacks, and
up to 64% for hispanics.1 18
Economist George Gilder has argued that welfare pay-
ments subvert family life among the poor by making the poor
male an expendable commodity:
Above all, by making optional the male provider role, wel-
fare weakens and estranges the prime mover in upward mo-
bility. Unlike the mother's role, which is largely shaped by
biology, the father's breadwinner duties must be defined
and affirmed by culture. The welfare culture tells the man
he is not a necessary part of the family: he feels dispensable,
his wife knows he is dispensable, his children sense it . ...
As a result, men tend to leave their children, whether
before or after marriage. Crises that would be resolved in a
normal family may break up a ghetto family. Perhaps not
the first time or the fifth, but sooner or later the pressures
114. Chicago Tribune, Sept. 16, 1985, at 7, col. 2.
115. C. MURRAY, supra note 2, at 262.
116. Id. at 148-53.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 152.
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of the subsidy state dissolve the roles of fatherhood, the dis-
ciplines of work, and the rules of marriage." 9
Gilder's analysis is not without fault or criticism.2 0 It is
nonetheless true that in some urban ghettos half of all chil-
dren are born out of wedlock, increasingly to teenage
mothers. Traditionally, the birth of a child implied responsi-
bility, a burden (albeit a welcome one) taken on by father and
mother alike. Birth in the ghetto has become the ultimate
symbol of irresponsibility, the product of males in search of
immediate gratification and, as is more and more often the
case, young girls aware of welfare benefits which come with
giving birth to a child. One study indicates that pregnant
teenagers who are eligible for public assistance are signifi-
cantly more likely to deliver their babies out of wedlock.' 21A
recent poll found that an overwhelming majority of poor
women believe that women like themselves give birth in or-
der to receive welfare benefits. 2 2 If, contrary to Gilder's ar-
gument, the welfare state does not cause irresponsible behav-
ior, it at the very least subsidizes it.
It may very well be overstating the case to suggest that
public spending is singularly responsible for the demise of the
family among the poor, and among blacks in particular. Fam-
ily instability among the poor is to a degree symptomatic of
119. G. GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 122 (1981).
120. Levitan and Johnson write:
[Bjesides his bizarre presentation of male sexuality and motiva-
tion, Gilder's explanation of the link between public assistance and
famiiy dissolution is based on highly selective data and held to-
gether by unsubstantiated logic. While Gilder portrays the inabil-
ity of husband and father to provide for his family as central to
the disintegration of marriages, he fails to acknowledge the extent
to which the inadequacies of the labor market contribute to this
frustration. Whatever sense of personal failure accompanies the
inability to support one's family, it certainly would be at least as
powerful if the family lived in abject poverty as in welfare depen-
dency-the obvious difference being that the secure income of
welfare heightens the potential independence of wife and mother
under such adverse circumstances. Yet in Gilder's view all mem-
bers of low income-families would be better off if welfare pay-
ments were withheld, for while they may might have less income
the male heads of households would still retain their pride,
thereby fostering the preservation of stable marriages.
S. LEVITAN & C. JOHNSON, BEYOND THE SAFETY NET: REVIVING THE PROMISE
OF OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICA 62-63 (1984).
121. V. FUCHS, supra note 90, at 105-06.
122. Lewis & Schneider, Hard Times: The Public on Poverty, PuB. OPIN-
ION, June-July 1985, at 1, 7.
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broader social trends encompassing both rich and poor. On
the other hand, it is hardly an overstatement that social
spending has had no positive impact on the family. One even
finds confirmation of this abroad. Sweden, for example, has
taken the notion of the welfare state to its logical conclusion.
Yet in a nation noted for its cradle-to-grave social services,
the divorce rate is 60% higher than in the United States."'3
One-third of all births occur out of wedlock, and fully one-
half of all pregnancies are terminated in abortion.""' For
those who would look to social planning as a panacea for the
family predicament, Sweden should serve as a cautionary
reminder.
B. Enterprise
As for the impact of public spending on the enterprise of
the poorest of all Americans, the so-called "underclass," the
war on poverty is perhaps more noteworthy for what it can-
not do than for what it has done. To begin with, it is doubt-
ful whether public programs ever reach the most needy.
Forty percent of the truly poverty-stricken receive no welfare
benefits1 25 - which is why we should be angered but hardly
surprised at frightful accounts of pathetic individuals comb-
ing trash bins for food or freezing to death in the streets on
winter nights.
Aside from its questionable efficiency, the welfare state
fails to address the very source of the ghetto despair and
alienation. Malcolm X, in an eloquent diatribe on the conde-
scending nature of the welfare state, captured the resignation
and despair in the urban ghetto:
If they wanted more to do, they could work on the roots of
such ghetto evils as the little children out in the streets at
midnight with apartment keys on strings around their necks
to let themselves in, and their mothers and fathers drunk,
drug addicts, and thieves and prostitutes. Or they could
light some fires under northern city halls, unions, and ma-
jor industries to give more jobs to negroes to remove so
many of them from the relief and welfare rolls, which cre-
ate laziness, and which deteriorated the ghettos into stead-
ily worse places for humans to live . . . . One thing the
123. Figures cited in Gilder, Faith, Family, and Progress, 35 NAT'L
REV. 427, 429 (1983).
124. Id.
125. Kondratas, supra note 4, at 38.
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white man can never give the black man is self-respect. The
black man can never become independent and recognized
as a human being . . . until he is doing for himself what
others are doing for themselves." 6
"Doing for oneself" is the very premise of upward mobil-
ity as well as self-respect. Sociologist Marshall Clinard has
noted that the distinguishing characteristic of the ghetto is
the pervasive sense of powerlessness. 127 What are welfare
agencies and government bureaucrats but quintessential re-
minders of powerlessness and dependency? The poor stag-
nate because, among other things, "decisions have been
made for them for so long that they have generally failed to
develop the experiences and skills necessary for motivating
themselves for social change.1 128 To expect that welfare pro-
grams can eliminate futility and resignation is wishful think-
ing of the most dangerous kind. It is enterprise, not paternal-
ism, which will galvanize the poor.
There is in addition, a real danger that the extensive
availability of transfer income may undermine the traditional
vehicle through which the poor have channeled their work
ethic. Welfare benefits have increased dramatically in the last
twenty years, outpacing increases in personal income.' 2 9 As
Dwight Lee aptly observes, most people "are remarkably ad-
ept at rationalizing the acceptability, indeed the virtue, of
things that provide them benefits."13 0 The NIT study cited
earlier in this article confirms Lee's misgivings. Work effort
among those guaranteed a minimum income declined be-
tween 10 and 34%."3
Gwartney and McCabell have suggested that, along with
the immediate financial disincentives, there is attendant to
welfare programs a "moral hazard effect," which occurs
when the consequences of risky behavior are insured against
by government programs. 32 Some individuals are poor be-
cause they dropped out of school, have become addicted to
alcohol or drugs, or are simply lazy. A private insurance com-
126. Quoted in Parker, The Nature of Poverty, 33 NAT'L REV. 415
(1981).
127. Clinard, The Role of Motivation and Self-Image in Social Change in
Slum Areas, in PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN POVERTY 329 (V. Allen ed. 1970).
128. Id.
129. Gwartney & McCaleb, supra note 1, at 9.
130. Lee, The Politics of Poverty, 5 CATO J. 17, 20 (1985).
131. C. MURRAY, supra note 2, at 151.
132. Gwartney & McCaleb, supra note 1, at 12.
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pany, Gwartney and McCabell argue, would not insure
against such behavior, well aware that doing so would likely
increase the probability of its occurrence. 3 Poverty pro-
grams which do not distinguish between poverty resulting
from tragedy and poverty resulting from poor judgment pro-
vide just such insurance. Indiscriminate welfare programs
lower the price of improvidence.
But perhaps the most pernicious effect of the welfare
state on enterprise is its subtle indictment of the values of the
working poor. The immigrant poor have traditionally im-
proved their lot by working longer and harder at jobs that no
one else would take or by applying their energy and en-
trepreneurial skills to small business ventures. Murray ob-
serves that the customary reward for the working poor has
been society's applause for their efforts.' This reward is be-
ing robbed by a society which has made the alternatives to
working one's way out of poverty socially acceptable. What
do television advertisements publicizing the availability of
food stamps impress upon the individual working at two me-
nial jobs to feed his children? What is society rewarding? It is
quite possible that even the most valiant of souls, confronted
with persistent reminders of the welfare society's benevo-
lence, will ultimately question the value of his own more
painful efforts.
C. Community
The impact of social spending may not be limited en-
tirely to the poor. Ultimately, as social spending fails to elimi-
nate poverty and as more is demanded of the state, the very
nature of the relationship between the poor and non-poor
may change. If a market economy is to function both effi-
ciently and morally, the fate of the rich and poor must re-
main interrelated, both economically and spiritually. 3 But as
care of the poor is increasingly entrusted to a system of state-
133. Id.
134. C. MURRAY, supra note 2, at 187.
135. According to the Catholic bishops:
'I'he Biblical emphasis on covenant and community also shows that
human dignity can only be realized and protected in solidarity
with others. In Catholic social thought, therefore, respect for
human rights and a strong sense of both personal and community
responsibility are linked, not opposed.
National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Catholic Social Teaching and the
U.S. Economy, para. 83 (Second Draft 1985), reprinted in 15 ORGINS 257
(1985) Ihereinafter cited as Second Draft].
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imposed income redistribution, the moral bond between rich
and poor becomes attenuated. De Tocqueville's seminal
"Memoir on Pauperism" brilliantly posed the quandary:
The latter (public relief) allows the alms to persist, but
removes its morality. The law strips the man of wealth of a
part of his surplus without consulting him and he sees the
poor man only as a greedy stranger invited by the legislator
to share his wealth. The poor man, on the other hand, feels
no gratitude for a benefit which no one can refuse him
. . . . Public alms guarantee life, but do not make it easier
or more comfortable than individual alms giving; legal
charity does not thereby eliminate wealth or poverty in so-
ciety. One class still views the other with fear and loathing
while the other regards its misfortune with despair and
envy. Far from uniting these two rival nations. . .it breaks
the only link which could be established between them. It
ranges each under one banner, tallies them, and, bringing
them face to face, prepares them for combat." 6
De Tocqueville's observation, if portentous in style,
surely raises a timely consideration. Because care of the poor
had traditionally rested with family, neighbors, private chari-
ties, parishes, and mutual aid groups, the poor were very
much a presence in the lives of the non-poor. How many
Americans today have had contact with the poor other than
through television or their daily expressway travels through
dilapidated ghettos? To what extent has the welfare state
made the poor an "alien" culture? And how long before, as
DeTocqueville forewarns, they will be perceived as a threat?
The Catholic bishops, in the recent draft of their pas-
toral letter on the economy, declared that "the fact that
more than 15% of our nation's population lives below the of-
ficial poverty level is a social and moral scandal that must not
be ignored."'3 7 Leaving room for argument regarding the
wisdom of the specific programs outlined in the letter, the
underlying call for human dignity and economic justice is
binding. The bishops correctly assert: "In our view .
there can be no legitimate disagreement on the basic moral
objectives.' 3' Yet as Lawrence Meade persuasively argues,
and the bishops must surely agree, the moral imperative
136. de 'I'ocqueville, Memoir on Pauperism, reprinted in PUB. INTEREST,
Winter 1983, at 102, 114.
137. Second Draft, supra note 135, para. 20.
138. Id. para. 86.
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should not be viewed entirely in the short run.?1 9 If the long-
term impact of extensive public social spending is to cripple
the will and ability of the poor to climb out of poverty, then
it in turn becomes a moral scandal.
All the foregoing might be summarily dismissed as
purely academic musing. Not so easily dismissed is the fact
that $46,920 is spent on every poor family of four in the
United States, enough to lift each and every such family
above the poverty line. 4 It would be difficult to find a more
damning statistic on the celebrated war on poverty. If noth-
ing else, it strongly indicates that initiatives to assist the poor
must take on a new direction.
III. THE SOLUTION
Unless one is willing to abandon entirely the free mar-
ket, we must recognize that for a variety of reasons some per-
sons will at certain times be poorer than others. Future ef-
forts must enable these persons to get on their feet and to
move on, as well as assist those who simply cannot. The wel-
fare state has proven marginally successful at the latter, and
increasingly incompetent at the former.
Along with this initial recognition must come the realiza-
tion that there is a value in the very struggle to escape pov-
erty. The Italian immigrants, the Jews, and Fr. Divine's fol-
lowers all began their ascendancy at the bottom, inching
their way forward often at great sacrifice. Most everyone will
acknowledge the pride, discipline, knowledge, and invaluable
experience which comes from "doing for oneself." Why are
we to assume that the contemporary poor are less deserving
of this same avenue to respectability, acceptance, and ulti-
mately, affluence?
If generous public spending has not improved the long-
term prospects of the poor, common sense would dictate that
it be curtailed. Yet there is understandable hesitation at even
entertaining such a draconian measure. What, one is com-
pelled to wonder, would happen to the poor? Can they sur-
vive without extensive government assistance?
A. The Italian Mutual Aid Societies
Between 1890 and 1910, some five million Italian immi-
139. Mead, Social Programs and Social Obligations, PUB. INTEREST, Fall,
1982, at 17, 31.
140. Lee, supra note 130, at 18.
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grants arrived in the United States. 4 Upon their arrival,
they generally found themselves at the low end of the eco-
nomic and social scale. In 1910, Italian immigrants earned
lower average incomes than either native whites or blacks. 42
They lived in scandalous housing at densities of 1,000 per-
sons per acre, again rates lower than for native whites or
blacks." 3 Unskilled and uneducated, they swarmed into me-
nial jobs such as construction, streetcleaning, and factory
work."' Living conditions in Italian neighborhoods were so
poor that the Vatican felt compelled to issue a document de-
crying their fate: "[I]t is humiliating to realize that, after the
disappearance of the Indian and the emancipation of the ne-
groes, it is the Italian immigrants that have become the pari-
ahs of the great American republic.""'
Despite conditions of abject poverty, Italian immigrants
typically refused any form of public assistance." They gen-
erally accepted any employment available, turning to charity
only when women and children were suffering, or when
"they had exhausted or starved bodies, stricken with ill-
ness.""'  Unwilling to accept public relief, the Italian immi-
grants excelled at forming mutual aid societies, which were
often composed entirely of "paesani", or immigrants from
the same town in Southern Italy." 8
In 1915, there were between 2,000 and 3,000 Italian
mutual aid societies in New York City alone." 9 The more
prominent ones, such as the Societa di Unione e Benevolenza
Italiana, provided assistance to budding businesses, particu-
larly in the heavily Italian Mulberry district. 5 ' Smaller socie-
ties provided assistance to needy families and individuals.' 5'
The La Fraterna society, which by the turn of the century
had some 2,000 members, paid out over $14,000 in sick and
141. J. LoPREATO, supra note 63, at 12.
142. See supra note 62.
143. T. SOWELL, supra note 26, at 111.
144. J. LoPREATO, supra note 64, at 143-44.
145. ISTITUTO DI STUDI AMERICANI, GLI ITALIANI NEGLI STATI UNITI
231 (1972) (author's translation).
146. T. SOWELL, supra note 26, at 116.
147. Id..
148. Pozzetta, The Mulberry District of New York City: The Years Before
World War One, in LITTLE ITALIES IN NORTH AMERICA 7, 20 (1981) [herein-
after cited as LITTLE ITALIES].
149. Id. at 19.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 19-20.
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death benefits in one year alone.15 2
Mutual aid societies met a variety of needs in Italian
neighborhoods throughout the United States, largely de-
pending on the exigencies of a particular community. In Bal-
timore, for example, the difficulty in obtaining construction
loans led to the creation of the Garibaldi Building Associa-
tion, which provided funds enabling many Italian immigrants
to build their first homes.1"3 In Tampa, mutual aid societies
provided a comprehensive health insurance program.15' In
St. Louis, they functioned as private welfare agencies, provid-
ing sick benefits as well as a fund to assure to all members a
meaningful funeral."5 The leading society in St. Louis also
operated a co-operative grocery and meat market. 5
As Italian-Americans slowly climbed to middle class sta-
tus, the significance of the mutual aid societies declined. By
the 1980's, Italian-Americans earned well above the national
average, and mutual aid societies had either entirely disap-
peared or had evolved into social and civic organizations.
These mutual aid societies proved remarkably effective
in conditions of ignominious poverty seldom equalled in
American history. The absence of public assistance in such
squalid conditions did not lead, as one might suspect, to wide-
spread social ills. Italian immigrants generally maintained low
rates of crime, alcoholism, divorce, and illegitimacy.15 7
Mutual aid societies were not unique to the Italians. The
Chinese had a variety of community organizations, among
these the hui kuan, which served as immigrant aid socie-
ties. 5 The hui kuan provided credit and served as employ-
ment agencies.1 59 They even served a judicial function, pro-
viding mediation for quarreling Chinese.1 0 The hui kuan
established a rotating credit system which became the princi-
152. Id. at 33 n.48.
153. Scarpace, Baltimore's Little Italy, in LrrrLE ITALIES, supra note
148, at 105, 118.
154. Rizzo, The Italian Heritage in Tampa, in LITTLE ITALIES, supra
note 148, at 123, 136-37.
155. Mormino, The Hill Upon a City: The Evolution of An Italian-Ameri-
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pal source of capital for entrepreneurship and business devel-
opment in Chinatown. 1 '
The capacity of an unskilled, uneducated, and generally
ill-prepared ethnic group to overcome poverty without gov-
ernment assistance is an important if oft-forgotten historical
lesson which should not be easily dismissed. And in the
1980's, when public anti-poverty expenditures loom large,
the contrast between the resignation fostered by government
programs and the pride and determination engendered by
self-help initiatives is all the more enlightening. The transfor-
mation of Washington's Kenilworth-Parkside housing project
is a telling case in point.
As a public housing project, Kenilworth typified the ur-
ban nightmare. It was characterized by crime, widespread
drug abuse, rampant teenage pregnancies, and high rates of
welfare dependency. 62 In 1982, frustrated residents pre-
vailed upon city officials to transfer management of the com-
plex to a resident organization. 63 Within two years, crime
decreased 75% and welfare dependency and teenage
pregnancies were reduced by half.164 The physical plant also
improved dramatically. 65 Capturing a simple truth which
seems to evade the architects of the welfare society, the head
of the residents' board of directors explains that the residents
of Kenilworth-Parkside are behaving responsibly because, for
the first time, they have responsibility.6 "
It should hardly be surprising that local private initiatives
to assist the poor are far more effective than public welfare
agencies. In times of crisis, individuals turn first to family
members, friends, neighbors, their ministers, their church,
voluntary groups, and ethnic subgroups. 6 ' If bureaucrats do
not know the most effective channels for reaching the poor,
the poor certainly do.
There are in the United States some 500,000 organized
churches and synagogues, and an additional 29,000 private
welfare agencies."' The challenge is to permit these '.'mediat'
161. Id. at 35.
162. Vigilante, A Successful Test of the Agenda in D.C., Wash. Times,
Jan. 17, 1985, at D1, col. 1.
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ing structures," as they are often called, to assume a greater
role in the efforts against poverty, much as the mutual aid
societies did for the Italian immigrants. The most ready
means of accomplishing this goal is by gradually reducing the
scope of public relief efforts. Studies indicate that increases in
federal spending programs have led to a decline in private
charitable giving, although the correlation is far from cer-
tain.16 9 In any event, the salient consideration is that in the
absence of extensive public assistance, the poor and their
more affluent neighbors tend to mobilize. The Italian immi-
grants did so by forming mutual aid societies. Korean busi-
nessmen have created rotating credit associations to assist less
successful compatriots.""' When the Reagan administration
announced plans to curtail social spending, black leaders
urged that alternatives to government programs be found.'
Accusations of callousness, inevitable when proposals to
reduce welfare programs are forwarded, ring hollow when
one considers the plight of the urban poor in the wake of
enormous expenditures. Reductions in such programs must
be made not because the poor are to be abandoned, but be-
cause they deserve, like the poor before them, the opportu-
nity to better their lot. Certain programs, such as programs
for the elderly, disability insurance, and school lunch pro-
grams should be retained. All other federal programs should
be gradually but systematically reduced. The ultimate impact
of the reductions would be twofold. First, they would under-
score to the poor that they, like their predecessors, can and
must rely on their own initiative, determination, and perse-
verance. And secondly, when it is simply impossible for them
MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 27, 34 (1977).
169. Abrams & Schmitz, The Crowding Out Effect of Government Trans-
fers on Private Charitable Contributions, 33 PUB. CHOICE 20-40 (1978). But see
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charity. The Urban Institute finding that two-thirds of the ex-
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flourished during a period of rapid government expansion runs
counter to conservative claims. The proportion of Americans will-
ing to volunteer a portion of their time in service to others has
also increased during the past two decades. The few studies that
have examined government expenditures and volunteer effort in
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or significant relationship between these two factors.
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to do so, those institutions closest to the individual would be
encouraged to lend a helping hand.
Can the poor in modern America survive without mas-
sive federal assistance? Consider the case of the illegal immi-
grants, and in particular the illegal immigrants from Mexico.
They arrive in this country overwhelmingly poor, unedu-
cated, and unskilled. 17 Yet they almost entirely avoid the
welfare system. Less than 5% of illegal immigrants receive
any form of public assistance, including food stamps, medical
benefits, or welfare.'7 While no one would necessarily point
with pride to the living conditions among the illegals, they
may in fact be better than those in many "native" ghettos.' 7 4
In any event, the presence of a large number of poor
illegals unassisted by government programs has not resulted
in widespread social chaos. There is strong evidence that they
have been catalysts in economic expansion in the areas in
which they exist in large numbers, which is far more than can
be said for "native" urban ghettos in general. 1 5 Indeed, ille-
gal aliens occupy much the same economic position as the
Chinese and Italians upon their arrival in the United
States. 71 Whether they will follow the same route to upward
mobility may well rest on their ability to avoid, as their immi-
grant predecessors did, the public relief syndrome.
Turning the bulk of initiatives to help the poor to pri-
vate relief efforts has three primary benefits. First, private or-
ganizations would likely be more effective in reaching the
very poor. As Berger and Neuhaus observe, no one need
show the Salvation Army how to care for the least fortunate
among us. 7 7 Secondly, the limited nature of assistance pro-
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vided by mutual aid societies, private charities, and other pri-
vate institutions assures that recipients are aware that such
assistance is temporary, and that they are ultimately responsi-
ble for their fate and that of their families. It is infinitely
more facile to rationalize dependency when the source is an
impersonal bureaucracy against which the recipient has rights
than it is when the donor is a neighborhood institution with
which he is personally acquainted and which has the discre-
tion to terminate assistance. Finally, shifting relief efforts to
parishes and other local voluntary associations helps to re-
store the link between the poor and the non-poor by making
the poor a presence in the lives of ordinary Americans,
rather than remaining the province of disinterested
bureaucrats.
In view of the bishops' recent call to action, Catholics
have a special obligation to make a personal commitment to
assist the needy. Caesar Arredondo, a member of the Lay
Commission on the U.S. Economy, points out that the forty-
four million non-poor Catholics could make significant con-
tributions in reducing the poverty of the eight million poor
Catholics, and enumerates a number of innovative proposals
to that end.'7 8 Similarly, Michael Novak has noted that the
number of non-poor religious persons in the United States
outnumbers the eighteen million poor children by a margin
of at least five to one. 7 9 Surely such ratios could be chan-
neled to assist needy children, who more than all others are
blameless for their plight. The Catholic social doctrine of
"subsidiarity" clearly recognizes the value of addressing so-
cial problems with such individualized and local efforts. 8 '
None of this should obscure what is perhaps the more
compelling consideration in the effort against poverty-the
demise of the family unit among the poor, and in particular
the black poor. Resurrecting mutual aid societies and other
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1985, at 14, 14-16.
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112, at 9.
jVol. 2
19851 ROOTS OF POVERTY 327
private relief efforts will not in itself revive family life and
values. That task will rest largely with the poor themselves,
who must recognize that they can ill-afford to break up their
families or to reject responsibility for their offspring. Reduc-
tions in social spending would hopefully help to bring this
message home. Churches, and in particular the black
churches, can play a role in the effort. Leaders can urge and
inspire. But ultimately, the determination must come from
within. In this struggle, the best hope is that the poor will
understand the roots of their poverty better than have the
policymakers.

